When Pierre Gadonneix arrived as head of EDF in 2004, the idea that France’s energy major could consider international expansion was almost risible.

At the time, the state-owned electricity monopoly was in danger of drowning under the weight of €24bn ($37.7bn) debt, and other potential liabilities of €22bn, built up during a costly global expansion spree.

Worse, the operator of Europe’s largest fleet of nuclear power stations was embroiled in a highly political battle over its Italian subsidiary Edison, Italy’s second biggest generator, where voting rights were capped at 2 per cent.

Four years later, the company has been partially privatised, debt has been brought down, liabilities reduced and the Italian mess resolved with a bilateral energy accord. And, in spite of the pain of the previous spending spree, EDF now has one of the strongest European portfolios of any energy player, with leading positions in the UK, Italy and Germany.

Now, Mr Gadonneix has the time and finances to move in an energy market where the vast investment required to meet demand is likely to mean that only the biggest and most international will prosper.

Moreover, the pressure is on at home. Competition is beginning to erode, albeit slowly, EDF’s stronghold on the French market, where the group earned 65 per cent of operating profits in 2007.

Clearly it is in this context that EDF has emerged as one of the leading contenders for British Energy, Britain’s largest producer of electricity, and operator of eight out of 10 of the country’s nuclear power stations.

EDF has much to offer, being the operator of Europe’s largest fleet of nuclear power stations. And a bid fits its publicly stated strategy to leverage its nuclear expertise in four markets – the US, UK, China and South Africa.

Yet British Energy is just one of several options the group has pursued in recent months, leading to accusations that EDF’s international strategy relies more on political lobbying than on a clear vision. This has led to a confusing number of initiatives in continental Europe that have sparked political controversy, says one nuclear executive.

“EDF is the one company that unites all European companies against it,” he said.

“It is a company that is totally impossible to buy, but it can buy everyone else. It is the shark and everybody else is the prey.”

Just a few months ago EDF emerged as a bidder for Iberdrola in Spain, a market it had long coveted. EDF’s interest was raised at the recent summit between Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Spanish prime minister. However, the attempt to front a break-up bid through a partnership with Spanish construction group ACS led to a fierce public backlash.

All signs now point to a cooling of EDF’s interests in Iberdrola. However, if it does revive the assault, it can expect a fight.

In Belgium, too, its strong French political connections could work against it. EDF was privately outraged when the French government allowed the merger of quoted utility Suez with state-controlled Gaz de France. That deal will present the biggest challenge to EDF’s hold on the French energy market.

Lobbying hard for a quid pro quo, Mr Gadonneix appears to have won the French state’s tacit support to acquire Distrigaz, the Belgian gas distribution business that must be sold by Suez to meet European Union conditions. But, with Suez already owning the country’s largest power producer Electrabel, such a deal will face protests from the EU and Belgium.

For such a political company, this opposition is perhaps not unexpected. So Mr Gadonneix is keen to stress that EDF would never consider a hostile bid. But whether diplomacy will be enough to win over the opposition remains to be seen. (leave in this sentence) Paradoxically, the EDF boss may yet have to rely on politicians to give public commitments on his independence if he is to silence the critics.